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Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actors are
increasingly utilizing Living-off-the-Land (LotL) cyber
attack techniques to avoid detection. LotL are
techniques that abuse legitimate functionality to perform
malicious cyber activities. A common LotL cyber
attack technique, that is currently very difficult to
detect and prevent, is malicious process injection,
MITRE ATT&CK ID: T1055. We report on the initial
results for HESPIDS: A Hierarchical and Extensible
System for Process Injection Detection using Sysmon.
We developed a hierarchical graph-based detection
approach for accurate and automated detection for
five process injection techniques in Windows. These
techniques include four of eleven T1055 sub-techniques:
DLL Injection, PE Injection, APC Injection, Process
Hollowing, plus API Hooking (T1056.004). Our novel
detection approach exhibits, within the limitations of
our small testing environment, very high sensitivity and
specificity. HESPIDS demonstrates a promising avenue
for development of automated detection of advanced
cyber threats.
1. Introduction
Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups are
increasingly utilizing an attack technique known as
Living off the Land (LotL). LotL is a type of cyber attack
technique in which legitimate system functionality is
abused to perform unauthorized or malicious cyber
activities. The SolarWinds attack, first discovered in
December 2020 [5], used several attack techniques that
fall within the LotL category.
LotL techniques allow malicious actors success
at evading detection when executing unauthorized
activities. LotL cyber attacks are sometimes referred
to as zero footprint attacks, since the attack does not
require the installation of malware on the compromised
system.
1.1. Current Problem
LotL attacks are very difficult to detect and prevent
because they abuse functionality that is used in the
system as part of its expected operation, which makes
separating authorized from unauthorized operations
extremely difficult. This difficulty, in detecting LotL
attacks, causes delays in discovery and mitigation
because security operation center (SOC) threat analysts
have to manually investigate these events.
The MITRE ATT&CK framework [22] is a
knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques that
provides common cyber attacks nomenclature. MITRE
ATT&CK defines Process Injection (ID: T1055) as “A
method of executing arbitrary code in the address space
of a separate live process [22].” T1055 defines 11
sub-techniques. Process Injection is one of the most
commonly used LotL cyber attack techniques.
1.2. Contribution
Our objective was to empower threat analysts by
investigating automating the detection of LotL Process
Injection attacks in Windows. We believe we succeeded
through the design of HESPIDS: A Hierarchical and
Table 1. Mitre att&ck: process injection (T1055)
sub-techniques plus sub-technique T1056.004
ID Sub-technique Name
T1055.001 Dynamic-link Library Injection
T1055.002 Portable Executable Injection
T1055.003 Thread Execution Hijacking
T1055.004 Asynchronous Procedure Call
T1055.005 Thread Local Storage
T1055.008 Ptrace System Calls (Linux)
T1055.009 Proc Memory (Linux)




T1056.004 Credential API Hooking





Extensible System for Process Injection Detection using
Sysmon. HESPIDS uses a hierarchical graph-based
detection approach that exhibits accurate detection for
five sub-techniques, shown in bold in Table 1.
1.3. Overview of the Rest of this Article
The rest of this article is organized as follows:
Section 2 provides a review of related work. Section
3 details the development and evaluation environment.
Section 4 describes our automated detection approach
and corresponding experiments and results. Section 5
presents our conclusion and potential future work.
2. Related Works
Published research concerning the detection
of process injection attacks in Windows is very
limited. Current solutions focus on malware detection
approaches not capable of adequately detecting process
injection and other LotL cyber attack techniques. In this
section we present the most closely related works and a
brief comparison with HESPIDS.
2.1. Related Academic Contributions
Mavroeidis and Jøsang: Research in 2018 by
Mavroeidis and Jøsang [8] proposed a “...cyber threat
intelligence ontology (CTIO) rich enough for consuming
and representing information from several different
sources, such as taxonomies, sharing standards, and
domain expertise with the purpose of supporting
decision making” [8].
Approach: Mavroeidis and Jøsang [8] used Sysmon
Aggregator to aggregate Windows event logs. Then
they passed a combined file to a parsing engine which
passed the results to a lookup engine; the lookup
engine queried a database. The results of the query
were passed to a SPARQL engine which produced a
Resource Description Framework (RDF) output. This
RDF coupled with the threat information sharing engine,
produced a threat classification.
Prediction Model: Based on the resulting RDF
and the threat information sharing engine, the decision
making engine provided a threat classification of High,
Medium, Low, or Unknown.
Mikhail et al.: In 2020, Mikhail et al. attempted
to answer the question “Can a framework be developed
for non-data scientists to determine whether a given
adversary technique is best detected with a heuristic
analytic or a machine learning (ML) analytic?” [11]
Approach: Mikhail et al. consolidated multiple
system events into a single process event. The single
process event was then used to generate analytics using
a tree ensemble machine learning model. Data was
gathered by deploying six host sensors in the MITRE
production network. These sensors collected data for
approximately two weeks.
Prediction Model: Based on the values from the tree
ensemble model the highest scoring single path from all
the trees was extracted. Mikhail et al. state that the
presented approach “... can detect multiple variations of
a single attack technique by capturing and generalizing
system behaviors [11].”
Sun et al.: In 2021 by Sun et al. [23] investigated
the DNS activities of malware injected processes versus
the DNS activities of Program-DNS processes.
Approach: Sun et al. [23] analyzed two factors.
The first factor was consistency ratio which
measured the similarity of a DNS request by a process to
DNS requests for similar processes. The second factor
was domain types where the types of the domains
queried were captured.
Prediction Model: The prediction model consisted
of a machine learning algorithm. There were two
datasets for training data for the classifier and two
additional detection datasets for training data.
Myllyla and Costin: In 2020 by Myllyla and
Costin’s research focused on the pitfalls concerning
failed detection, including attempting to define their root
causes [12].
Approach: After careful analysis Myllyla and
Costin created detection logic and rules to search log
queries from an SIEM.
Prediction Model: Myllyla and Costin’s prediction
model used custom search queries and Sigma rules to
detect previous undetected malicious processes.
HESPIDS: Compared to related articles HESPIDS
shares some similarities such as event collection and
log aggregation. However HESPIDS is unique in its
graph-based prediction model and its implementation
using current open source tools.
Log Analysis: HESPIDS automatically aggregates
the Sysmon logs by forwarding the logs using Windows
Event Forwarding. The log collector then forwards
the aggregated logs using Winlogbeat to the Hunting
Elasticsearch Logstash Kibana (HELK) stack. The
HELK stack uses KSQL to implement a decision graph.
Prediction Model HESPIDS prediction engine uses
a dynamic decision graph implemented using KSQL
queries. The result of these queries, which are run
dynamically, periodically, and automatically classify
sets of observed events as potentially malicious. The
detection of a malicious process injection attack is then
displayed on the SOC analyst’s screen.
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2.2. Other Related Work
Web searches for malicious process injection
detection in Windows result in very few significant
works or resources. Two works that standout on this
area are: The CyberWarDog blog by Roberto Rodriguez
[18] and the article in Ten Process Injection Techniques
by A. Hosseini [7]. Rodriguez’s blog provides several
detailed articles on how to detect malicious process
injection in Windows using Sysmon. Hosseini’s article
is very likely the most detailed account and classification
of process injection techniques in Windows.
Furthermore, to investigate the state-of-the practice,
we installed the latest available version of Security
Onion [3]. Security Onion is an open source security
operations center (SOC) toolset. It includes full support
for Plays (pre-encoded SOC level alert rules) written
in the Sigma alert rules language and all 265 Sigma
Community rules preinstalled [14]. Within this set
of 265 community rules, a search for T1055 returns
seven plays. These seven plays are for generating
alerts targeted to specific indicators of compromise
for specific malware or known exploits, for example,
CVE-2019-1378 or Dridex. A search for T1056 returns
zero plays. These seven plays are extremely specific
which makes them less susceptible to false positives but
also susceptible to bypass.
The Sigma rules language specification and
associated rule rewriting plugins [14] do support
sharing pre-encoded alerts. However, the Sigma
language was developed as a way to encode and share
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)
alerts. SIEM alerts are focused on string pattern
matching rather than the higher level correlations
needed for threat hunting.
Moreover, The MITRE ATT&CK page on available
mitigation techniques for process injection attacks
in Windows (M1040) provides a generic mitigation
strategy and references just two articles. The first is
an article by Microsoft [10] on how to enable a set of
Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules in Windows. The
second is an article by M. Nelson [13] describing how
to mitigate DDE-based attacks and a mitigation for the
specific case of Excel being injected through OneNote
via DDE.
It’s possible commercial SOC toolsets contain
other predefined and pre-encoded techniques for
automatically and accurately detecting process injection
attacks in Windows. However, if these techniques exist,
they do not appear to be shared widely with the SOC
and threat hunting communities. Common languages for
specifying and sharing high-level threat hunting tasks
also appear nonexistent.
Figure 1. HESPIDS virtual laboratory environment
3. Development/Evaluation Environment
Using a powerful workstation we created a simulated
organizational network and mini-SOC using virtual
machines (VM) and virtual networks. The workstation
hardware was an AMD Ryzen Threadripper 1950X
(32 vCores) CPU, 64 GB RAM, and 1 TB NVMe.
The workstation software was Windows 10 Edu and
VMWare Workstation. The virtual machines in this
environment and their network connections are depicted
in Figure 1 and described below.
We used this environment to: (1) carry out simulated
process injection attacks, using Atomic Red [17] and
InjecProc [15]; (2) collect, forward, and store log/event
data; (3) search and analyze log/event data; (4) develop
and test our detection; and (5) verify and visualize
detection results.
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Figure 2. Sensing and detection data flow for our mini-SOC development and evaluation platform
1. DC: Domain Controller; Windows Server 2019
VM; vRAM: 8GB, vDisk: 100GB, vCPU:
02. This VM simulates an enterprise Windows
domain controller that manages authentication
and group policies [9]. Implemented policies
require all client PCs (Client 01) Windows
logs be automatically forwarded to the Log
Collector every minute (rate is configurable).
2. Log Collector: Windows Server 2019 VM;
vRAM: 16GB, vDisk: 100GB, vCPU: 08. Its
role is collecting Windows logs from Client
01 and forward to the mini-SOC (HELK) using
Winlogbeat [4].
3. HELK: SOC analytics; Ubuntu 20.04 VM; vRAM:
16GB, vDisk: 100GB, vCPU: 08. This
VM was built based on a customized version
of the Hunting Elasticsearch Logstash Kibana
(HELK) toolset [19]. HELK is an open
source toolset for security analytics and threat
hunting. It uses Apache Kafka which is an
event streaming and analytics platform supporting
the KSQL stream-oriented query language [1].
This customized environment enabled live data
analytics of Sysmon events collected from the
Windows client VM (Client 01). All internal
VM components were run using Docker.
4. Client 01: Windows 10 Edu VM; vRAM:
16GB, vDisk: 100GB, vCPU: 08. This client
was fully patched and joined to the domain
implemented by DC. This client PC was the target
of the simulated process injection attacks. It had
installed Sysmon with a tailored configuration.
5. Internal Router: pfSense VM; vRAM:
4GB, vDisk: 40GB, vCPU: 1. This VM simulated
an edge router/gateway.
HESPIDS’ implementation environment relies on
the HELK stack and Kafka, coupled with Windows
Sysmon, Windows Event Forwarding (WEF) and
Winlogbeats. These applications all work together to
collect and aggregate logs and implement the detection
graphs. The output of the detection graphs, implemented
using KSQL, may be shown in a Kibana dashboard.
Then a security analyst can connect to the environment
and visualize the results of the automated threat
classification, as shown in Figure 3.
3.1. Software Components and Data Flow
Figure 2 illustrates HESPIDS’ threat intelligence
architecture; flow of data; detection query creation; and
visualization and analytics. Once the Sysmon data
is passed from the Log Collector machine to the
HELK machine, using the Winlogbeat stream, the
HELK stack controls processing the data.
The Kafka Broker controls the flow of the data. The
Kafka broker and the KSQL database perform a series
of joins on the data to determine if a malicious process
injection is occurring. Once the data is returned to
the Kafka broker from the KSQL database, the broker
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Figure 3. Kibana dashboard showing 100% detection rate from a set of 15,461 host events collected from one
windows client using sysmon
pushes the data to Logstash. In Logstash the data
is normalized and transformed, and the transformed data
is sent to Elasticsearch. The data is converted to a JSON
format and displayed on the Kibana dashboard.
The Winlogbeat stream is the most fundamental
stream in the detection system, because it contains
all the fields for each Sysmon event. All other
streams, queries, joins and tables are derived from the
Winlogbeat stream. Since HESPIDS is hierarchical
in nature, the stream from Winlogbeat is the
foundation of the hierarchy.
3.2. Tailored Sysmon Configuration
Sysmon [20] requires a configuration file when
launching. This configuration file is customizable and
events raised may be included or excluded as needed.
The configuration used was based on a modified version
of the Sysmon configuration developed by Malware
Archeologist [2]. This Sysmon configuration was
developed to maximize the detection capabilities while
reducing the number of false positives; that is, events
raised that do not correspond to malicious process
injection. We further tailored Hartong’s configuration to
exclude related events raised by Microsoft Teams when
launching and Google Chrome when running updates.
This tailored Sysmon configuration file, in combination
with our detection graphs, eliminated all of the false
positives observed within our testing environment.
3.3. Process Injection Tools
To simulate repeatable process injection attacks two
tools were chosen:
• Atomic Red [17]: Atomic Red is a library
of simple focused detection tests, with few
dependencies, that can be used by automation
frameworks. The tests are small and portable and
and mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
• InjectProc [15]: InjectProc is an open source
project that allows automated testing of common
process injection techniques including DLL
injection, portable execution, and APC Injection.
4. Injection Experiments and Detection
Graphs
Based on the article by A. Hosseini titled Ten
Process Injection Techniques [7], we developed
Table 3.3 that details those ten process injection
sub-techniques, then maps these to their corresponding
MITRE ATT&CK framework [16] sub-technique. Table
3.3 also maps the techniques, both as defined by
Hosseini and by MITRE ATT&CK, to the tools we
used for the injections, the corresponding research
experiments we performed, and also the corresponding
detection graphs. As shown in Table 3.3, Experiments 1
and 2 were performed using Atomic Red. Experiments
3, 4, and 5 were performed using InjectPro, with
different call parameters.
Table 1 details the 11 sub-techniques for the Process
Injection technique (T1055), as defined by MITRE
ATT&CK, plus sub-technique 1056.04: Credential
Hooking. Two sub-techniques apply to Linux hosts.
Hence, 10 sub-techniques are applicable to Windows
hosts. As stated before, and also shown in Table
1, in this research we analyzed five out of ten
process injection sub-techniques in Windows. The
five targeted techniques are shown in bold font in
Table 1. We developed, implemented, and evaluated
detection graphs for those five sub-techniques. For
space reasons, we describe three of five detection graphs
and corresponding evaluation experiments.
Page 7542
Table 2. Detail of process injection techniques as reported by hosseini [7] with mappings to mitre att&ck,
performed experiments, and detection graphs
Hosseini Hosseini Sub-technique Name MITRE Experiment Test Detection
ID ATT&CK Number Used Graph
01 Classic DLL Injection T1055.01 1 AtomicRed Fig. 4
02 Portable Executable Injection T1055.02 3 InjectProc Fig. 6
03 Process Hollowing T1055.12 2 AtomicRed Fig. 5
04 Thread Execution Hijacking T1055.03 None N/A N/A
05 Hook Inj. Via SetWindowsHookEx T1056.04 4 InjectProc Fig. 6
06 Inj. and Persist. Via Registry T1546.09 None N/A N/A
07 APC Inj. and Atom Bombing T1055.04 5 InjectProc Fig. 6
08 Extra Window Memory Inj. T1055.11 None N/A N/A
09 Injection Via Shims T1546.11 None N/A N/A
10 IAT Hooking T1056.04 None N/A N/A
The following subsections describe in detail three
out of five selected experiments, the corresponding
detection graphs, and the obtained results. It is
important to note that none of the detection graphs, and
their respective hierarchy of queries, include file names,
nor process names, nor specific keywords as indicators
of compromise. Instead, the detection is based purely on
the correlation of events needed for malicious process
injection to happen. This should make the detection
much more resilient to changes on the implementation
of the attack than currently used string matching based
or machine learning detection approaches.
Before developing the detection graphs we dedicated
a substantial amount of time analysing the host event
data in search of patterns that would be suitable for
a generic detection graph. Also, when designing and
building our detection graphs we iterated through many
versions. Once a detection query graph was converted
into a set of hierarchical queries and then implemented
in Kafka, using KSQL, the Kafka broker ran the
query every minute on the incoming data streams.
Then it forwarded results to Logstash where the
output was normalized and forwarded to Kibana. The
stream from Kibana was transformed into JSON and
then forwarded to be displayed on the SOC analyst’s
dashboard. Figure 3 displays the value two, representing
the number of positive hits for the top query after
running one of the experiments.
4.1. Experiment 1: DLL Process Injection
with Atomic Red
4.1.1. Experiment Details Technique: Process
Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection, T1055.001.
Atomic Test Name: Process Injection via
mavinject.exe. Description: Windows 10 utility to
inject DLLs. Upon successful execution, powershell.exe
will download T1055.dll to disk. Powershell will then
spawn mavinject.exe to perform process injection in
T1055.dll. With default arguments, expect to see a
MessageBox, with Notepad’s icon in taskbar.
4.1.2. Detection Graph Details Figure 4 illustrates
the detection graph for Experiment 1: Classic DLL
Injection. It contains five levels. Level one at the base
of the hierarchy starts with the Winlogbeat stream.
The final detection query resides at level five, at the
top of the hierarchy. Moving up the hierarchy, the
WINLOGBEAT REKEY STREAM PGUID contains
the parent process global unique identifier. The
WINLOGBEAT REKEY STREAM GUID is rekeyed
on a processes’ global unique identifier. Rekeying
the Winlogbeat stream allows for renaming the
fields, which allows for easier queries, and it allows
for a set key for the streams at the next level in
the hierarchy that are derived from either of these
two streams. The key is used to join two streams
together for query. Moving up the hierarchy to
the middle level, there are three streams. These
streams are SYSMON PROCESS CREATION PGUID,
SYSMON PROCESS CREATION GUID, and
SYSMON IMAGE LOADED. Each of these
streams are constructed to detect specific
malicious process injections. For testing purposes
there were seven malicious process injection
attacks, these three are the hierarchical basis
for all attacks. At the fourth level resides
SYSMON PROCESS CREATION TABLE PGUID.
This table is created from a multi-join query. This
table was created because KSQL documentation states
that creating a multi-join query on streams only in a
certain time frame can potentially lead to unpredictable
Page 7543
Figure 4. Detection graph for DLL injection with atomic red T1055.001
behavior. For this research it was determined that
creating multi-join queries, within the same time frame,
led to missed logs and detections. To solve this problem
the SYSMON PROCESS CREATION TABLE PGUID
was created. Once the table was created the logs were
accurate with no missing logs and detections. The
final detection query, at the top of the hierarchy, is
DLL INJECTION EX1 DETECTION QUERY JOIN.
This detection query is created using an inner
join of SYSMON PROCESS CREATION GUID,
and SYSMON IMAGE LOADED with
SYSMON PROCESS CREATION TABLE PGUID.
4.1.3. Detection Graph Results The detection
graph successfully distinguished Atomic Test
T1055.001 test number one via the sysmon-join-*
index pattern in Kibana raising two hits. The detection
query did not flag 16,244 events that are in the logs-*
index pattern. The first hit shows that powershell.exe
was used to start notepad.exe and then execute mavinject
with the INJECTRUNNING switch on the process ID
of the now running notepad process with T1055.001.dll.
The second hit shows the actual target notepad process
and pertinent information about the process.
4.2. Experiment 2: Process Hollowing with
Atomic Red
4.2.1. Experiment Details Technique: Process
Injection: Process Hollowing T1055.012. Atomic
Test Name: Process Hollowing using PowerShell.
Description: This test uses PowerShell to create a
hollow from a Windows portable executable (PE) on
disk with explorer.exe as the parent.
4.2.2. Detection Graph Details The detection
graph for process hollowing, T1055.012 is built
from the DLL injection detection graph, Figure 4.
The graph for process hollowing (T1055.012) adds
an additional stream at level three. This stream is
derived from WINLOGBEAT REKEY STREAM GUID
and is named SYSMON PROCESS HOLLOWING.
This new stream is specific to Sysmon event
ID 25. This new stream is then inner joined
with the DLL INJECTION EX1 DETECTION
QUERY JOIN to create a new detection query named
DLL INJECTION EX2 DETECTION QUERY JOIN.
Figure 5 illustrates this detection graph.
4.2.3. Detection Graph Results The detection
query successfully distinguished the simulated attack
via the sysmon-join-* index pattern in Kibana raising
two hits. The detection query did not flag 12,023
events that are in the logs-* index pattern. The first
hit shows that powershell.exe was used to execute
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Figure 5. Detection graph for process hollowing with atomic red T1055.012
Start-Hollow.ps1 which hollows out and injects into
the memory of a process defined in the script. The
second hit shows the actual target process (cmd.exe)
and pertinent information about the process.
4.3. Experiment 3: PE Process Injection with
InjectProc
4.3.1. Experiment Details Technique: Process
Injection: Portable Execution Injection, T1055.002.
InjectProc Test Name: PE injection via InjectProc.
Description: InjectProc defines the steps to inject the
executable as: (1) Create target process and suspend it,
(2) Unmap from memory, (3) Allocate space, (4) Write
header and sections into the remote process, and (5)
Resume remote thread.
4.3.2. Detection Graph Details Figure 6 illustrates
the detection graph for Experiment 3: Portable
Execution injection attack with InjecProc. Similar
to Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, to detect
InjectProc injection attempts the base of the hierarchical
detection graph begins with the Winlogbeat stream.
Moving up to hierarchy, the Winlogbeat stream is
rekeyed to WINLOGBEAT STREAM REKEY GUID, and
WINLOGBEAT STREAM REKEY TUID. It is important
to note the stream names were purposely renamed
from the Atomic Red attacks stream names. For
example, the rekeyed stream for Atomic Red attacks
was named WINLOGBEAT REKEY STREAM GUID.
For the InjectProc attacks the stream was named
WINLOGBEAT STREAM REKEY GUID, with the words
STREAM and KEYED being swapped. This allowed the
authors to easily determine which process injection tool
was being used for the attack.
Moving up the hierarchy is the query
SYSMON PROCESS CREATION GUID which
represents all the processes created. The query
SYSMON PROCESS ACCESS detects all processes that
are requesting access to another process. At the top
of the hierarchy is the inner joined detection query
PROCESS INJECTION DETECTION QUERY JOIN.
This inner join is detecting all processes that were
created that are trying to access another process.
One should expect that this query would result in a
fair amount of false positives. However, though this
sequence of events happens in Windows systems, it does
not happen very frequently. Our Sysmon configuration,
in Subsection 3.2, prevented these from being marked
as false positives.
4.3.3. Detection Graph Results The detection
query successfully distinguished InjectProc PE
Injection via the sysmon-join-* index pattern in Kibana
raising four hits. Not flagged were 10,418 events
from the logs-* index pattern. The first hit showed
powershell.exe accessed the InjectProc.exe image. This
hit also showed the executed injection command, the
path to the injected process and the malicious DLL
name used in the injection. The remaining hits show
that other system executables accessed InjectProc.
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Figure 6. Detection graph for PE injection with injectproc T1055.002
4.4. Overall Results
Our graph-based HESPIDS approach was capable
of detecting, with high accuracy, five out of eleven
process injection techniques as detailed in table 3.3. We
believe the HESPIDS graph-based detection approach is
a step forward toward improving the state-of-the-art in
the automated detection of advanced cyber attacks.
We believe that the current status quo is not a
fault of the current state-of-the-practice but rather a
lack of adequate state-of-the-art support for improved
state-of-the-practice. It is not yet known how to
appropriately specify nor mechanize complex threat
hunting activities. Undoubtedly, an autonomous more
powerful and mechanized form of correlation is needed
to accurately detect LotL and process injection attacks.
Furthermore, a common language for specifying and
sharing high-level detection approaches is needed [21].
5. Conclusion and Future Work
Advanced malicious process injection techniques
used by APT actors are very difficult to detect and
mitigate in a timely manner. The problem of adequately
detecting malicious process injection in Windows
remains largely unsolved in the day-to-day operations.
The graph-based HESPIDS approach presented in this
article is a step toward a practical solution to this major
challenge. We successfully designed and implemented
a graph-based detection approach that is more resilient
than all other known approaches. Furthermore, this
approach was implemented using toolsets already in use
today by the threat hunting and security communities.
For future work we envision the following: First, we
plan to develop and implement detection graphs for the
remaining types of process injection attacks. Second,
we plan to expand the evaluation of our detection graphs
by automating the generation of benign events. Third,
we would like to scale the size and complexity of our
evaluation environment.
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